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Time is at the heart of understanding climate change, from the perspective of
both natural and social scientists. This article selectively reviews research on time
perception and temporal aspects of decision making in sociology and psychology.
First we briefly describe the temporal dimensions that characterize the issue of
climate change. Second, we review relevant theoretical approaches and empirical
findings. Then we propose an integration of these insights for the problem of
climate change and discuss mismatches between the human mind, surrounding
social dynamics, and climate change. Finally, we discuss the implications of this
article for understanding and responding to climate change, andmake suggestions
on how we can use the strengths of the human mind and social dynamics to
communicate climate change in its temporal context. © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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PERCEPTIONS OF TIME IN RELATION
TO CLIMATE CHANGE
Climate change refers to long-term changesin weather patterns, observed over at least
several decades.1 Among these are higher surface
air temperatures (‘global warming’), sea-level rise,
variations in precipitation, and more frequent
extreme-weather events.2 Climate change impacts
are wide-ranging and include changes in species
range3 and human health.4 Climate change requires
urgent mitigation and adaptation efforts.2 Despite
the scientific consensus many commentators have
observed a lack of action5,6 and have called for public
debate and engagement.7–9
This article will selectively review sociological
and psychological research on time perception and
temporal aspects of decision making. In particular we
will develop the idea that time is an important aspect
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of the broader dimension of distance and may be
linked to other facets of distance such as space and
social distance.10 Note that this article is a discussion
piece rather than an exhaustive review, presenting key
findings but only scratching the surface of a vast area
of research. Since the focus is on broad perceptions,
we do not discuss economic approaches (such as
economic discounting rates), nor do we focus on
scenarios which are addressed elsewhere in the issue.
Our main aim is to promote a serious conversation on
the key role of time perceptions in addressing climate
change.
First we briefly describe how climate change is
commonly framed in scientific discourse (e.g., typical
time horizons used). Second, we observe a number of
fundamental constraints that make dealing with the
timescales of climate change challenging for people
and for societies. Third, we review theories and
findings from the sociology of time. Fourth, we review
relevant theories and studies from psychology and
begin to relate these to behavioral responses. Fifth, we
propose an integration of these insights and discuss
mismatches between the human mind, surrounding
social dynamics and the problem of climate change.
Finally, we discuss the implications for understanding
and responding to climate change, and briefly review
emerging communication and intervention strategies.
We make suggestions on how we can play to the
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strengths of the human mind and social dynamics to
help overcome these mismatches in time perceptions.
THE TEMPORAL DIMENSIONS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE
There are a number of temporal dimensions that
characterize the biophysical phenomena of climate
change. Perhaps the most basic temporal dimension of
climate change is its extension into the future. While
impacts are already happening, the most significant
and far-reaching impacts of climate change lie in
the future. Thus there is a distance between our
lives now and these future climate change impacts.
Scientists use scenarios to model future climate change
effects, with typical target dates of mid- and end-21st
century.2,7 The Stern Review on economic impacts11
mostly uses a time horizon of 2050. The short and
long-term patterns of past climatic conditions are
also a key part of the science in setting baselines for
future change, but this article will focus mostly on
the future dimension and the concept of temporal
distance. A further temporal aspect of climate change
which complicates temporal distance is the time lag
between cause and effect.
The climate effects we see now are related to
carbon emissions that entered the atmosphere a long
time ago. Even if we stopped all additional carbon
emissions today, the carbon already in the atmosphere
will continue to have impacts for centuries. For
example, we would still see warming of about 0.1◦
per decade if we had kept carbon emissions at 2000
levels.2 The US National Research Council (Ref 12,
p. 3) summarizes these delays as follows: ‘[e]missions
reductions choices made today matter in determining
impacts experienced not just over the next few
decades, but in the coming centuries and millennia.’a
Next we take a closer look at some fundamental
constraints on the human mind and society that are
relevant to the temporal dynamics of climate change.
FUNDAMENTAL CONSTRAINTS OF
THE HUMAN BRAIN AND SOCIAL
STRUCTURES
Beyond the temporal dimensions inherent in the
physical phenomena of climate change, human
response mechanisms have their own temporal
dynamics and constraints. From an evolutionary point
of view it is not surprising that individuals and society
have difficulty understanding and dealing with the
climate change challenge. The human brain developed
in a time when humans were largely concerned
with their direct environment (e.g., foraging for
food) and immediate dangers (e.g., from predators).
Thus humans are geared to prioritize short-term
consequences of behavior and immediate futures.
Evolutionarily, we are also used to close cause-effect
relationships rather than those characterized by time
lag and lack of contiguity.13,14 While our brains
have evolved over millennia, the carbon challenges
we are facing today have only emerged in the last
century. No wonder our ‘ancient brain’ (Ref 15,
p. 291) is lagging behind today’s rapidly developing
complex challenges.16 In addition, increasingly urban
lifestyles mean we are distanced from gradual shifts in
seasonal cycles, weather patterns and environmental
conditions. Moving to cities reduces access to local
accounts and oral histories of past patterns available
to more rooted, place-based rural families in farming
and forest-dwelling communities,17 which can provide
a baseline to compare changes against.b
Moreover, humans live in a social context
that co-evolved with the brain and other physical
adaptations. Evolutionarily, we are used to living
in small groups and having direct contact with
those group members. Members of our social
group were the social agents to whom we were
accountable first and foremost. Accordingly, the
ethical frameworks used in thinking about the impacts
of our actions have typically been geared to situations
of immediate face-to-face relationships and where
chains of responsibility can be easily established.18
This is reflected at a societal level, where legal
institutions struggle to deal with liability where causal
chains are hard to establish, and where consequences
may not easily have been foreseen before acting.19
Climate change time dimensions clash with
shorter societal time constructs, e.g. 4 year election
cycles, and 5–20 year time-horizons used in commu-
nity planning or cost-benefit analysis.20 Tonn et al.21
found in their surveys that people on average thought
about the future as about 15 years out, with very lim-
ited ability to imagine the future beyond 10–20 years.
The standard timelines (e.g., 2050, 2100) used by
climate scientists are therefore not meaningful to the
general public, in those limited occasions when sci-
entists and the public interact (e.g., as in publicized
activities of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change).
Therefore, both psychological and societal
factors contribute to the difficulties humans have in
responding to events characterized by distance such as
climate change. That distance in space and/or time is
a key determinant of moral motivation and action has
long been recognized by philosophers, at least since
the Stoics articulated the concept of oikeio¯sis, which
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was appropriated centuries later by Adam Smith,22 in
arguing that the proximity of an individual is directly
relevant to our actions toward him or her.23
Societal time lags are also apparent between
the emergence of scientific evidence and regulatory
responses.24 Greenhouse gases and their effects have
been studied since John Tyndall’s work in the 19th
century, and US scientists began to warn policy
makers about global warming in the 1960s.25 Despite
the existence of early warnings, evidence from other
domains confirms that legislative responses can take
several decades. For example, the adverse health
effects of tobacco were publicized from the 1930s
onwards but smoking bans only became widespread
in Europe from 2000 onwards. Compared to the
regulation of tobacco, carbon emissions relate to
almost every segment of modern life, and addressing
it ‘requires billions of people to reduce their carbon
footprint’ (Ref 26, p. 533). Sterman and Booth
Sweeney24 observe that a ‘wait and see strategy’ is
popular amongst the general public and policymakers,
but argue this only works in simple systems with short
time lags, very unlike the climate change system.
In summary, it should be no surprise if
individuals and social groups find the issue of climate
change difficult to comprehend and act upon. The
next sections will review in more depth theories
and findings on time perspectives relevant to climate
change. First, insights from the sociology of time
will be described, followed by key concepts arising
from the psychology literature. We will summarize
relevant general insights about temporal processes
from these literatures and draw on environmental or
climate change examples wherever possible.
THE SOCIOLOGY OF TIME
The emerging field of the sociology of time,27 together
with environmental sociology,28 have emphasized that
social practices and natural processes are bound
together in a relationship of co-construction, in
which ‘consonance or dissonance’ between the two is
produced through different forms of timing, tempos,
and rhythms.29 Social and natural systems are linked
at different levels, which might be thought of as a
set of nested relationships between different temporal
scales over which change occurs at different rates.
These scales range from the deep time of geological
transformation to the accelerated rhythms of high-
volume automated economic exchanges on the world’s
trading floors. The relationship between society and
nature is not only shaped by the spatial scales of
causal processes but also by their temporal balance
or imbalance. The fastest rhythms of change may
create ripples that transform the slowest. For example,
the intensification of economic activity made possible
first by industrialization30 and then by information
technology, may accelerate historical change but,
through its impact on the emission of greenhouse
gases (GHGs), may also affect the vastly longer-term
climatological and geophysical processes implicated in
climate change. The social organization of industrial
production therefore links everyday human activity
with other time scales, all the way up to the
evolutionary and geological scales of the deep future,
as with climate change and species extinction.31
Human action can thus be understood in terms
of its timescape, its embeddedness in a context of
ongoing processes at different temporal and spatial
scales.32 The interactions between natural and social
systems are structured around their own characteristic
rhythms, and extend themselves into the past and
future. This provides a sense of temporal and spatial
context33 which can alert us to timescapes or legacies
of action that may greatly exceed everyday or standard
economic and political time horizons. For example,
practices which typified agriculture until the Industrial
Revolution were linked strongly to natural rhythms
of climate variation and seasonal growth and decay.
Sustaining agriculture required knowledge of these
rhythms and careful interpretation of signs of the
future. However, the introduction of inputs from
beyond this context (such as oil-based fertilizers)
introduced other processes (such as soil depletion,
phosphate pollution, and ‘peak oil’) into agricultural
timescapes that changed their character, and with it,
their potential futures (Ref 32, pp. 131–138).
The sociology of time can also alert us to
how the temporal patterns of social practice have
changed in tune with other social transformations.
It highlights how these shifts are related to changes
in time consciousness, to alterations in how people
and cultures attribute meaning to the past, present,
and future. Our subjective sense of time is changed
by experience, which has both social and material
(including technological) conditions which themselves
are subject to change.27,34 The perception of time
can thus be seen as something which is socially
produced or constructed, based on how social
practices prioritize particular elements of reality as
salient to their goals. The passage from agriculture
to industrial capitalism, for example, brought with it
significant changes in the subjective time of individuals
as well as in the objective temporal patterns developed
within institutions.35 The transition from peasant to
industrial economies was supported by new ways of
measuring and marking time that removed human
activity from the constraints of the cycles of day and
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night. This allowed new forms of production that
characterized industrial societies, but also changed
the meaning of the past and especially the future.
A particularly important example of this tran-
sition in our relationship to time is intensification.36
The goal of intensification is to use each instant of time
as efficiently as possible. As a new way of conducting
social activity, it became possible through a specific
shift in the social meaning of the future. During the
17th and 18th centuries, the future became increas-
ingly conceptualized for the first time in its totality37
as a collection of interconnected possibilities. The
new science of probability played an important role in
this38 by assigning both probabilities and expectation
values to future possibilities, based on the degree of
benefit or harm associated with them. As a result,
the future became a new field of expert knowledge.
The increasing use of risk and cost-benefit analysis
in governance during the 19th and 20th centuries
furthered this transformation of the future into a cal-
culable object (Ref 39, p. 247), and thereby an object
of public management and planning, but also one
of private exploitation.40 The future was therefore
constructed in a specific way: it became ‘empty’41 or
‘mechanized.’37 It effectively became a territory to
be controlled (as in efforts to, e.g. use sanitation to
reduce health risks from epidemics) but also occupied,
colonized and exploited (e.g., by futures trading, in
which future prices of commodities such as fossil fuels
form the basis of trades in the present and reshape,
in the process, future outcomes).42 The extension and
broadening of human expectations of control over
the future differentiates the future constructed within
modernity from that of previous epochs, in which
posterity was seen as belonging solely to supernatural
powers.41
This new focus within social institutions on plan-
ning the future may have unintended consequences,
however. Emptying the future also made intensifica-
tion possible. Efficiency could now be measured by
scientific time-and-motion studies undertaken under
Taylorism, or by increases in the number of trades
per second in automated high-frequency trading
(HFT) in financial markets.43 Intensification does not
necessarily produce more reliable outcomes, however.
Rather, it may increase the likelihood of unanticipated
consequences by speeding up the rhythms of social
action44 and by increasing the possibility of ‘interfer-
ence effects’ between different activities.45 In this way,
it reshapes established timescapes of action, as in the
example of agriculture given above. It increases the
likelihood that actions undertaken on one temporal
scale may affect other rhythms of activity and change.
For example, futures trading in fossil fuels may create,
over time, patterns of wider activity (e.g., investment
in unconventional oil resources) whose consequences
then intersect with the timescapes of interlinked
natural and social processes.42 In turn, interactions
between the economic colonization of the future and
processes that ensure the short-term economic health
of societies affect climate change (e.g., by making
the exploitation of tar sands economically viable and
releasing more GHGs).
Yet in modern societies which prize innovation,
the short-term economic and political competitive
advantages (such as freedom to maneuvre and pursue
one’s own interests) tend to accrue to social actors who
are able to adapt, in the shorter term, to intensification
by making and justifying decisions quicker than others
through socially accepted forms of expertise. Such
advantages are enhanced if actors can offload the
consequences of their action (e.g., externalities such as
climate change impacts) upon others far away in space
and/or time. This secures benefits for some actors by
producing islands of security and certainty for them
while producing uncertainty for others (Ref 46, p. 20).
So, transformations in social temporalities can
be the source of both social conflict and material
instability due to the effects they exert on the social
and natural worlds. The imperative to seek autonomy
and flexibility of maneuvre for short-term advantage
by avoiding longer-term commitments leads some
actors within societies (such as high-carbon industries)
to employ practices which colonize the future as a
resource for the present.
Such ‘strategies of autonomy’ can be contrasted
with strategies based on solidarity and collaboration,
aimed at developing more resilient communities.
Marris47 argues that some social groups (typically
those concerned with the longer-term consequences
of their actions, ranging from traditional societies to
some business communities) tend to pursue action
based on practices geared to, for example, fostering
reciprocal commitments and mutual aid, preserving
the stability of places and environments, and pooling
risk. As a strategy for reducing uncertainty, solidarity
deals with a different timescape than that associated
with the quest for autonomy. It stems from socially
conditioned understandings of time and future, and is
thought to be rooted in noninstrumental attachments
to place, to other people and to institutions.48
Yet while these attachments foster social trust and
reliable expectations of the future, they also expose
those which rely on them to greater vulnerability
and uncertainty within social systems that favor
intensification and reward, in the short term,
autonomy and flexibility. This distinction between
future-oriented strategies reveals the potential for
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conflicts between agents with the power to shape
faster and more extensively the future and those
agents whose futures are effectively colonized by the
strategies of others.
At the same time, economic inequities may
reduce any tendency of social actors to discount the
future. For example, evidence from studies of African
countries demonstrates that poverty and vulnerability
do not, as one might expect, lead to high rates
of temporal discounting.49 On the contrary, people
subject to poverty may be more likely to make
sacrifices in the present so as to maintain productive
capacity for the future (Ref 49, p. 320), suggesting
that ‘myopic self-interest is culturally circumscribed’
(Ref 49, p. 323). This suggests that a key influence
upon temporal perception and how it affects action
may be the implicit or explicit normative frameworks
associated with particular social practices, and how
these are embedded in groups and institutions.
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
TIME
If research in the sociology of time demonstrates how
the rhythms and tempos of social practices create
constraints within which groups and individuals must
operate, psychological perspectives can complement
these insights by examining social and cognitive
processes at the level of the individual. The focus
here is on the role of temporal aspects of individuals’
perceptions, judgements, and decisions.50 Memories
of the past are used to simulate the future, and
both processes share regions in the brain51; thus
psychological processes concerning past and future
are intertwined. Moreover, past and future are
characterized by their distance from the here and now
of direct experience.52 The following sections discuss
psychological concepts relevant to the perception of
time in the context of climate change.
Optimism about the Future
Broadly speaking, people have a tendency to focus
on good things both in the past and in the future.
We recall positive aspects about the past better than
negative aspects,53 and we generally expect good
things to happen to us personally.54 Such generalized
expectations for the future are relevant to perceptions
of environmental and climate change.
McElwee and Brittain55 were the first to link
outlooks for the future with environmental issues.
In their study, people who were more optimistic
about a range of possible future events that might
happen to either themselves (e.g., contracting an
illness) or to the world (e.g., war) were less concerned
about the environment. Building on this, Pahl and
Boomsma56 developed the optimism–pessimism scale
for environmental change (OPSEC), which asks
participants to rate their agreement with statements
such as ‘I imagine clean air and green spaces when
I think about the UK in 50 years’ time’ and ‘we will
discover additional environmental problems within
the next 50 years that we don’t even know about
now.’ Participants in three samples (students, general
public, and climate skeptics) were neither optimistic
nor pessimistic; their opinions were, on average,
neutral, which indicates a great degree of uncertainty
over the future. However, those who were more
optimistic displayed lower environmental concern.
Moreover, among climate skeptics in particular, more
optimism was associated with less guilt, less perceived
responsibility and lower behavioral intentions. Thus,
overall, optimism seems to be negatively associated
with an active response to environmental change.
Beyond a generalized outlook for the future,
people make a distinction between themselves and
similar others. They think that they will have a rosier
future than will others. This ‘optimism bias’ has been
shown for self–other comparisons (i.e., I am safer
than others), for families and communities (i.e., we’re
safer than other families and communities), and also
for spatially based judgements (i.e., our local area is
safer than are other areas),57,58 for a range of issues
including health risks resulting from environmental
pollution.59,60
However, optimism bias is not ubiquitous. It
disappears when people are told pollution is the
result of an accident,60 which could be because of
lack of perceived control under such circumstances.
Moreover, Sweeny et al.61 describe in a seminal
paper how optimism may change in response to
preparedness demands. When a ‘moment-of-truth’
approaches, people may shelve optimistic beliefs
in order to be prepared for dealing with a
potentially negative outcome. This could be crucially
important for the temporal dynamics of climate
change perceptions. However, while Sweeny et al.61
focus more on mundane events such as exam
results and health-related behavior where one readily
encounters moments of truth (e.g., results day, a health
assessment), the crucial moment of truth might not be
encountered easily in climate change. This adds to the
challenge when communicating climate change and
motivating people to take action.
Cognitive Biases and Direct Experience
Optimistic beliefs may be related to other cognitive
biases.c The availability heuristic suggests that people
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base their judgements on information that is readily
available in memory.62,63 Following from this, if it
is easy to recall information and images of a plane
crash, for example, the risk of such an event occurring
will be overestimated. If evidence for climate change
events is difficult to retrieve from memory, climate
risks will be underestimated (or biased toward very
salient information or images). Moreover, information
about climate change faces stiff competition from the
media barrage and other daily issues that are simply
more salient, compelling and urgent in demanding our
attention.64–66 Even if people have explicit goals for
dealing with climate change, for example by reducing
their personal carbon footprint, there are other issues
that demand attention more readily. In addition,
research in cognitive psychology has indicated that
individuals experience less emotive mental imagery
with respect to generalized long-term goals (such as
living more healthily or sustainably) compared to
short-term goals (such as eating a doughnut or driving
to the shop), because the former are less engaging
and may lack specific cues in our daily environment
that trigger appropriate action (whereas a doughnut
might be displayed in a shop we walk past, with
additional multi-sensory cues such as smell).67 Long-
term personal goals related to climate change tend to
be less specific and more difficult to maintain as salient
in daily life. Related to this, ‘climate change’ is not a
behavioral domain as such - it may become a frame
within which tangible behaviors can be situated, such
as making choices about thermostats, diet, travel, etc.
These types of influences may contribute to
the perceived distance of climate change and hinder
mitigative or adaptive responses. Strictly defined,
future impacts cannot be experienced directly (but
see section Toward Solutions in Time Perceptions of
Climate Change). However, direct personal experience
(a point of zero distance) is thought to affect risk
perception and concern. Akerlof et al.68 found the
more personal experience of climate change effects
Michigan residents reported (e.g., milder summers,
less snow) the higher were their perceptions of
local climate change risks. Similarly, Spence et al.69
demonstrated that personal experience of flooding
was correlated with concern over climate change
and willingness to save energy. Whitmarsh70 also
found evidence for this association in experiencing
air pollution but not flooding. However, none of
these specific studies provide direct evidence for a
causal link between personal experience and increased
perceptions of climate change. It could be that
people who are aware of climate change interpret
their experiences differently or are more sensitive to
environmental change.
Psychological Discounting and Risk
Perception
Many studies have shown that people place less value
on the same outcome the further in the future it lies;
future rewards appear less appealing the more distant
they are.71 In the same vein there is some evidence that
people rate environmental and financial consequences
less important the more delayed these are.72,73 Gattig
and Hendrickx74 suggest that negative outcomes are
taken less seriously to the extent that these outcomes
are characterized by high uncertainty, long delay and
distant places, all of which are dimensions associated
with psychological distance.52 For example, Moser
et al.75 found that over very long timescales (up to 1
million years), risk judgements for nuclear and other
hazardous waste reduced with temporal distance. In
their study, a stronger belief that future societies
could deal with waste was associated with lower risk,
whereas more emotional involvement was associated
with higher risk.
However, other evidence suggests that temporal
discounting does not necessarily apply to environmen-
tal risks76 (see also Ref 75) and that future outcomes
are viewed as more risky.77 Gattig and Hendrickx74
review six studies, some of which show the predicted
effect (of lower severity with increased distance),
whereas others find no effect of distance. Sundblad
et al.77 investigated environmental risk judgements in
a Swedish sample for consequences varying in time
(5, 50, or 100 years from now) and location (Swe-
den, Holland, or Bangladesh). Additional analysis of
their data showed that environmental problems were
perceived to be more probable and worrying with
increasing temporal and spatial distance. Uzzell78
(see also Ref 79) focused on spatial distance and
showed that environmental problems were perceived
to be more serious at the global than the local level.
These findings are not quite in line with Gattig and
Hendrickx’74 conceptual analysis, according to which
distant problems (spatial or temporal) should be dis-
counted more and thus perceived as less serious than
close problems. However, they are consistent with
the optimistic bias findings reviewed above, according
to which people perceive lower risks for themselves
and close others than for distant others. In sum,
temporal and spatial distances do not seem to have
uniform effects on judgements across studies. While
some studies carefully control potentially confounding
factors,72 other studies’ inconsistent findings might be
explained by third factors such as the type of risk, or
its scope. For example, ‘global’ impacts could be seen
to incorporate ‘local’ impacts.
Finally, an approach termed the psychometric
paradigm has described how nonexpert views of
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risk differ from expert views80 and offers insights
into the role of time in this process. According
to Slovic80 two sets of factors are associated with
higher perceptions of risk: perceived dread, severity,
and catastrophic potential (labeled ‘dread risk’) and
unfamiliarity, delay, and lack of observability (labeled
‘unknown risk’). Delay is the only obvious temporal
dimension that has received support here, although
lack of observability also relates to the dimension of
psychological distance. People can observe events in
the here and now, but they cannot directly observe
future events. Without the opportunity to observe or
experience directly, events have to be construed in
people’s minds. Construal level theory analyzes these
construal processes as a function of distance, and is
discussed next.
Abstractness of Future Outcomes (Construal
Level)
Trope and Liberman10,52,81 coined the term psycho-
logical distance to ‘describe the subjective experience
that something is close or far away from the self,
here, now’ (Ref 81, p. 440). As mentioned above,
in addition to temporal distance, these authors argue
that space, social distance and even hypotheticality
are also facets of the broader dimension of distance.
Psychologically distant events are represented in ‘why’
terms, using abstract, schematic, and decontextualized
mental representations that are related to meaning.
Psychologically close events are represented in ‘how’
terms, focusing on feasibility and including rich details
of the situation. For example, thinking about a foreign
summer holiday in a year’s time, the focus would be on
the lovely destination, on relaxing and having time for
the family. The day before embarking on the holiday
the focus would be on packing suitcases, remember-
ing passports and preparing to navigate unknown
cities and languages. Whether environmental change
is perceived as psychologically distant or close may
be important in how strongly people will react to
environmental change.
Initial evidence for construal processes in the
environmental domain was reported by Pahl.82
Participants were asked to describe a behavior in
terms of ‘how’ or ‘why’ and then indicate their
intentions for that behavior. For example, when
asked to consider how one can reduce plastic bags,
participants estimated they would engage in this
behavior sooner, than when asked why one would
want to reduce plastic bags. A simple difference in
framing behavior in how or why terms had an effect
on temporal intentions. This is broadly in line with
literature on action control and planning in the health
domain (see Ref 83 for an overview), which has
shown that construing a behavior in terms of ‘how’
is predictive of health behavior.84 To our knowledge,
the effects of ‘how’ construals have not been tested
in the environmental domain, although specifying
behavior in terms of ‘where’ and ‘when’ has been
tested (see Ref 85 for a summary on implementation
intentions). These construal processes require further
testing in the environmental domain but could be
important when trying to engage people with climate
change, as communications are frequently based on
addressing motives and values rather than feasibility
and the ‘how’ of action planning. In the same series
of studies,82 participants who explained why they
thought climate change occurs rated the likelihood
of climate change as lower than participants who
described how climate change manifests itself. This
could be important in a context of public discourse
that frequently focuses on reasons for climate change
rather than manifestations.
Spence et al.86 recently studied psychological
distance in relation to climate change in a
representative British survey. Their data showed
mixed results regarding how distant participants felt
from climate change. Participants thought climate
change would affect geographically distant as well
as close areas and people similar to themselves as well
as those in developing nations. Most importantly,
41% of people in this study thought that climate
change was already affecting Britain, with less than
5% choosing each of the options ‘in the next
100 years/beyond the next 100 years/never.’ Thus,
in this particular study there was limited evidence
that people felt psychologically distant from climate
change, particularly with regard to temporal distance.
However, psychological closeness (in terms of impact
on local areas and ‘people like me’, and for ‘we
are already feeling the effects’) was positively related
to increased concern about climate change and
preparedness to act.d People who felt subjectively
close to climate change were more concerned and
willing to take action. This supports the importance
of psychological distance proposed by construal level
theory.
Construal might also be important for address-
ing the attitude–behavior gap. While people often
report positive attitudes for future environmen-
tal behavior, this is not necessarily reflected in
real actions. Rabinovich et al.87 proposed that this
attitude–behavior gap can be reduced by making a
distant-future perspective salient. Participants were
asked to describe their country’s environmental situa-
tion in 10 years (distant future) or in a month’s time
(close future). Attitudes and intentions were more
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strongly correlated in the distant future scenario than
in the close future scenario. This is in line with con-
strual level theory’s assumption that far distance is
associated with meaning and values, and that small
detail and feasibility considerations play a bigger role
when considering the near distance, possibly interfer-
ing with one’s valiant longer term goals.
The Role of Individual Differences in Time
Orientation
The studies summarized so far have focused on tempo-
ral processes that are common and shared within the
human psychological system. However, another area
in psychology describes consistent enduring differ-
ences between individuals. For instance, people can be
distinguished by their preferred time orientation. Some
people habitually prefer a future time perspective,
characterized by subjectively important and meaning-
ful mental representations of the future and a focus
on future goals and achievements, whereas others
habitually think more about the past or the present.88
Milfont et al.88 summarize the literature on individual
differences in using time perspectives, and relate this to
environmental engagement. Aggregating over 19 stud-
ies and more than 6000 participants, these authors
show that stronger future time orientation is associ-
ated with thinking about environmental problems and
taking steps to address these. This research suggests
that stable, enduring person differences in time orien-
tation may also play an important role in determining
individual and collective responses to climate change.
INTEGRATING INSIGHTS ABOUT THE
HUMAN MIND AND SOCIETY
This section attempts to synthesize key issues and
develop insights from the preceding discussion of how
human minds and society perceive elements of time
(especially the future) in relation to climate change.
This includes contextualizing temporal perceptions of
climate change within existing social structures for
considering the future.
People have a major interest in looking into
the future, yet they also have difficulty doing so.
Our ancient brains and societal perspectives (both
longstanding and modern) are not well suited to
the timescales and time lags of climate change. In
many modern cultures, psychological and social
influences work together to prioritize the short-term
and in multiple ways to distance us from far-reaching
consequences, even though these may be scientifically
or pragmatically anticipated.
If people do look into the future, they tend to
believe good things will happen to them and their
families and communities. Future outcomes loom less
large than immediate outcomes and are thought about
in abstract, generic terms as opposed to immediate
issues that are thought about in great detail and
specificity, and for which rich images and associations
already exist in memory. These processes buffer peo-
ples’ perceptions of climate change (and of its causes
and solutions), in the absence of directly experiencing
it. At the same time, societal practices and autonomous
actors co-construct temporal perceptions and norma-
tive frames, exerting powerful influences on people
and institutions: how we perceive time matters hugely.
These processes may equally apply to communicators
and decision makers in society, the media, and govern-
ment; this may lead to very slow societal change and
delay in implementing effective policy and action on
climate change. We are likely to find when we get there
that future worlds have indeed been ‘colonized’ and
compromised by earlier social practices and actors.
Thus it seems that popular temporal perceptions
of climate change, for understandable reasons, are out
of sync with the emerging reality of climate change,
and moreover, might be seen by some as dangerous
perceptual disconnects or even misperceptions. There
is a conundrum here: people generally view climate
change as long-term and slow, while important fea-
tures of social life, such as economic relationships and
our use of technologies, are increasingly structured by
intensification and thus geared to immediate signals
and short-term actions; in fact, it is actually very late
in terms of action to slow or stop irreversible and
accelerating climate change, and it is society that is
moving very slowly.
Such ‘mismatches’ raise the question of
approaches available to inform and engage people in
understanding the temporal implications of climate
change. Currently, there are few decision-making
or planning processes that help us as a society to
think systematically about the future and face up
to the challenges of climate change (though some
mechanisms exist for planning for emergencies such as
environmental and social catastrophes, and the IPCC
process aims to engage at the global level). In some
places comprehensive Environmental Impact Assess-
ments of alternative future choices are undertaken
(under programs such as the US National Environ-
mental Protection Act, 1969) and these are starting
to build in long-term climate change interactions.89
However, these studies usually remain the domain
of experts, lying outside the mainstream of most
people’s experience. More conventional city, regional
and resource planning, intended to map out future
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desired conditions for communities, often presume a
steady-state and fail to address climate change issues
systematically.17 Planning and public involvement
methods are only now adapting to the reality of
climate change,90 but may be unengaging to many
in society and tend to be poorly attended. Thus, we
currently have inadequate mechanisms for organizing
wider society for a changing and uncertain future.
Much of the research reviewed above has
focused on temporal perceptions in individuals, with
decision on outcomes that affect only themselves. Less
is known about the way in which people negotiate
time scales in groups and communities and how this
affects decisions about collective outcomes. Little is
also known about the understanding of temporal
dimensions of climate change among decision makers
in particular. It is also noticeable that much
psychological research has tended to focus on the
flaws in human understanding and processing (e.g.,
in the heuristics and biases approach62,91). In line
with recent commentators,15 it is time to shift from
this focus to a more integrative approach, exploring
people’s mental strengths to engage them in addressing
these challenges, rather than solely attempting to
turn everyone (including decision makers) into mini-
scientists.
TOWARD SOLUTIONS IN TIME
PERCEPTIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
If the timescales of climate change are out of step
with those of the human mind and the future is
seen as distant and vague, future implications may
become meaningful only when translated into a nearer
time horizon. Humans are powerfully influenced by
stories that relate to themselves and their communities,
and by visual images. These mental capacities can
be seen as strengths which can be used to engage
people with the temporal dimensions of climate
change. In a study by Nicholson-Cole92 participants
noted that they could not see the effects of climate
change happening and therefore saw little reason
to react. Participants found it easier to visualize
future climate change when this related to their
personal life. Similarly, Leiserowitz93 states that
individuals lack vivid and personally relevant images
of climate change. Individuals find it difficult to
see the relationship between behaviors and their
consequences when there is a long delay between
the two.13
Rather than presenting abstract data and pro-
jections, communicators could use more intuitive
scenarios, perspective taking, narratives, and com-
pelling visualizations to make future environmental
consequences of behavior visible, and render global
processes tangible in exploring their potential local
effects.17 Making the invisible future visible repre-
sents a considerable advance over the simple provision
of information, particularly where the agency and
creativity of participants is engaged.90 Other tech-
niques include focusing on how similar others might
be affected in future.
For example, Pahl and Bauer94 used perspective
taking with a young woman in the future to portray
future health effects of environmental change in
an intuitive and compelling manner. Combining a
personal narrative with images of environmental
impacts led participants of the same age as the narrator
to seek information on pro-environmental behavior.
Interestingly, the personal narrative only worked
when participants literally took the perspective of
the woman in the future, not if they were instructed
to remain objective and concentrate on the facts.
Recent research has suggested that the issue of
optimism bias could be circumvented by focusing
messages around risks to other people (rather than the
self), in order to avoid a defensive or denial reaction.
In a health example, smokers were more inclined
to accept smoking restrictions when they perceived
risks to others.95 Focusing on others could also
work when conveying the broader positive benefits
of climate action. Climate change deniers were more
willing to take pro-environmental actions when these
actions were framed as behaviors that will have a
positive effect on others and society more broadly.96
It is also possible that, compared to environmental
benefits, it might be easier for individuals to relate
to how mitigation efforts could benefit society. Thus,
social benefits such as a more supportive and helpful
community may be easier to imagine and construe
with greater detail than environmental benefits such
as a slowing of ocean acidification. This would be in
line with the cognitive processes discussed above.
So far we have suggested two potential ways
for communicating climate change risks. On the one
hand, these risks could be related to a person’s own
experience and context if this does not pose too much
of a threat. On the other hand, they could be related to
impacts on similar or close others to reduce potential
denial and optimism bias if outcomes are potentially
very threatening.
Narrative framings of climate change may
assist in expanding the frameworks through which
individuals and groups interpret their temporal
relationship to others, and the position of their
activities within a nested set of timescapes. Kahneman
(Ref 97, p. 407) suggests that ‘the mind is good
with stories but does not appear to be well-designed
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for the processing of time’. A variety of approaches
have been applied to test the value of narrative as a
means of reshaping socio-temporal frameworks. The
Long Now Foundation, for example, designed the
Clock of the Long Now, which ticks once per year for
10,000 years.98 The aim of such activities is to provide
touchstones for re-imagining the relationship between
present and future (as well as past) generations, and
for counteracting imaginatively as well as conceptually
habits of mind and emotional investments that
encourage short-termism.
Other narrative approaches designed to engage
emotion and imagination as a counterweight to
intensification and short-termism pay close attention
to the role of attachment to place and community as a
tangible link with the future. The work of artists
Newton and Helen Harrison, such a Greenhouse
Britain is built around scenarios concerning the effects
of rising sea levels on the Mersey Estuary and the Lea
Valley in the UK.99 By working over an extended
period of time with local people, as well as local
planners, scientists and policy-makers, the Harrisons
have produced near-term science fiction scenarios that
exploit local knowledge of connectedness to imagine
how communities will change their ways of living in
the face of climate change. Further, their work re-
injects human agency into this process through dialog
and collaboration, enabling people to give voice to
fears and offering them the opportunity to retrieve
concrete hope in the face of uncertainty. Recent
academic work has used scenario narratives as one
element in a participatory approach on the topic of
whole energy system change.100 Participants found
it easiest to imagine a ‘do-nothing’ scenario ‘where
nothing had been done to address climate change and
energy issues’ (Ref 100, p. 41). However, alternative
scenarios that were more sustainable and innovative
were seen as highly desirable.
Future scenarios are an integral part of
climate scientists’ work but they are typically
undertaken at global abstract levels and presented
in the form of carbon figures and line graphs.2
In many instances of scenario use, people and
human impacts are not even mentioned. Scenario
delivery mechanisms can be improved by using a
more local and human-scaled approach, focusing on
daily life and recognizable places, in current and
future (before/after) conditions.101,102 Scenarios can
also be used to contextualize long term modeling,
e.g. forest models which typically extend to two
rotations (200 years). When used with realistic
landscape visualizations and narratives in a local
climate change ‘visioning’ process,101 scenarios can
provide a simulated but direct experience of future
climate change, framed as alternative storylines that
can disclose considerable uncertainties. Sheppard17
describes a range of techniques that explore temporal
concepts such as time lapse sequences, ‘time
travel’, bringing the future closer, and making it
more personal. Evaluations of structured visioning
processes have found effects of increased urgency
and concern in public and practitioner samples,
improved awareness of future implications, and
increased motivation to act.90,102,103 Such approaches,
which help people think about the practical detail of
implementing adaptation and mitigation solutions,
should enhance conventional planning methods and
may lead to actual policy or behavior change.104 In
terms of policy implications, our analysis suggests two
things. First, temporally distant outcomes should be
‘brought closer’ to encourage consideration alongside
other more immediate concerns. This could be
achieved using the approaches summarized above,
in a variety of contexts such as consultation exercises.
Importantly, the audience in such approaches should
include decision and policy makers rather than just
‘the general public’, because they are affected by the
same temporal processes. Second, the existing time
horizons within planning and policy processes should
be reviewed critically to assess their suitability to issues
such as climate change.
The goal of approaches of this kind is
to contribute to a reshaping of the normative
frameworks within social practices, and to contribute
to ways in which individuals may act, as members
of interest groups, communities, governmental
bodies and other collectivities to change the ways
they ‘live’ their relationship to the future. With
modernity, consequentialist forms of thinking about
moral reasoning and motivation became socially
dominant.105 Yet climate change is an issue where
talking about future consequences is problematic,
for all kinds of reasons, some of which we have
reviewed above, and one where social practices based
on calculative consequentialism may create social
dynamics that intensify climate change and increase
short-termism. To motivate action in the face of
climate change may (paradoxically) require ethical
and legal frameworks that do not focus solely on
outcomes as the criteria of whether actions are right
or not. Indeed, it may be necessary to focus instead
on how to build individual and group capabilities,
capacities and ‘virtues’ needed to change how the
future is lived and related to.106,107 From the point
of view of moral philosophy, this would imply
moving from moral, legal and governance frameworks
informed by utilitarianism or act-consequentialism to
ones based on a kind of virtue consequentialism.
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CONCLUSIONS
Climate change is long-term, delayed, with potentially
rapid nonlinear changes. Individual and societal
systems, on the other hand, are adapted to face-
to-face interactions, and to considering short-term
outcomes, immediate and linear effects. From a
human mind perspective, we have argued that time
is an important facet of the broader dimension
of psychological distance that is deeply relevant to
climate change. The challenges we are facing with
climate change are complex and involve a system
of interrelated societal actors and a long chain of
causes, consequences, and possible human responses.
However, the current dominant culture and our
evolutionary history minimize the importance of long-
term thinking. Rhythms are out of sync. This does not
imply that people are unable to comprehend climate
change, it simply means communicators need to be
smarter and engage people on their own terms and
capabilities.
If there is a genuine desire for an integrative
negotiation of our climate change futures it is
imperative to improve how we engage people and
practitioners in envisioning the future, acknowledging
the future implications of their current lifestyles and
community choices, and getting involved in decision-
making and action. At the same time, the findings
from climate science will have to be made much
more meaningful, compelling and engaging, if it is to
integrate with everyday life and be able to compete
with many other influences, while not compromising
the rigor of the underlying science. Above we have
listed some promising examples including better
use of people-sized scenarios, perspective taking,
future visualization, and narrative approaches. If
opportunities are taken to employ such approaches,
we are optimistic that humankind can positively
engage with and address the temporal challenges
associated with climate change.
NOTES
a Another temporal dimension concerns the frequency
of climate change impacts. For example, extreme
weather events (e.g., heat waves, heavy precipitation
events) are thought to have occurred more frequently
over the last 50 years and predicted to continue
to increase in frequency and intensity.2 A further
dimension is the duration of effects. For example, heat
waves are predicted to last longer1 and the fire seasons
in Canada are expected to lengthen.108 Other more
complex aspects of time, such as rate of change or
discontinuities of climate change, are also important.
We focus on future climate change and delay because
these have been discussed most in the psychological
and sociological literatures.
b However, social mechanisms for dealing with future
adverse events have long existed in indigenous
cultures, e.g. storing food for hard winters and the
concept of maintaining the productivity of the land
for future generations.109
c The term bias is used to describe a systematic
tendency found in a majority of people without
implying that this is necessarily normatively wrong.
d In one deviation to this pattern, higher perceived
impact on developing countries (distant) was also
related to preparedness to act, illustrating that people
may be motivated through different routes, including
moral impetus to look after more vulnerable others
(see Section Toward Solutions in Time Perceptions of
Climate Change).
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